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This Article summarizes and discusses important developments in North 
Dakota oil and gas law between August 1, 2019, and July 31, 2020. Part II 
of this Article will discuss common law developments in both state and 
federal courts in North Dakota and Part III will discuss the state’s recent 
legislative and regulatory developments. 
II. Judicial Developments 
A. Supreme Court of North Dakota 
Pennington v. Continental Res., Inc. 
In Pennington, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that a force 
majeure clause applied to the primary and secondary terms of an oil and gas 
lease but remanded the case to find whether Continental had acted 
diligently and in good faith in obtaining a drilling permit.
1
 In 2011, the 
Plaintiffs signed oil and gas leases that were for an initial term of three 
years with a lessee option to extend for one year that also had a force 
majeure clause that said the oil and gas leases would not expire if drilling 
operations were delayed due to acquiring permits.
2
 Continental was 
assigned the leases in 2014 and utilized the extension option where its 
application for a drilling permit on 2,650 acres was delayed due to an 
endangered species.
3
 Continental then created a 1,920 acre area to remove 
the endangered species from the permit area to expedite the permitting 
process and began drilling in January of 2016.
4
  
The Plaintiffs sued Continental arguing that the leases were expired and 
Continentals “delay in obtaining regulatory approval to drill did not extend 
the leases”
5
, and that the delay was unreasonable because Continental could 
have drilled on a smaller portion of land during the primary portion of the 
lease.
6
 Each party moved for summary judgment, but the district court 




                                                                                                             
 1. Pennington v. Continental Res., Inc., 2019 ND 228, 932 N.W.2d 897, 902–03 (N.D. 
2019). 
 2. Id. at 899. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 900. 
 6. Id. at 902. 
 7. Id. 
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed that the force 
majeure clause applied to both the primary and secondary terms of the lease 
because no limiting language was found in the lease.
8
 The court stated a 
force majeure clause needs proof of diligence and good faith
9
 and remanded 
the case because the district court did not consider “whether Continental 
acted diligently and in good faith in pursuing a permit to drill the 2,560-acre 
spacing unit for more than three years.”
10
 
Continental Res., Inc. v. North Dakota Dep’t of Envtl. Quality 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that a suit is not ripe for 
judicial review when administrative remedies remain available.
11
 
Continental sought a declaratory judgment to eliminate uncertainty found in 
North Dakota Administrative Code § 33-15-07-02(1) where it states “No 
person may cause or permit the emission of organic compounds, gases and 
vapors, except from an emergency vapor blowdown system or emergency 
relief system, unless these gases and vapors are burned by flares, or an 
equally effective control device as approved by the department.”
12
 
Continental argued that the current limit of technology did not allow it to 
follow the code.
13
 Continental also stated that in issuing a Notice of 
Violation, the Department had “abruptly changed course in its 
enforcement.”
14
 The department argued, among other things, that 
Continental’s claim was not ripe for judicial review.
15
 
Because administrative remedies remained available to Continental, the 
district court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss.
16
 On appeal, 
Continental argued that a declaratory judgment, even with administrative 
remedies available, was appropriate when the claim is a question of law.
17
 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota was not persuaded and reasoned that 
because the Department was the appropriate entity to determine if the 
technology existed combined with the unambiguous plain language of the 
                                                                                                             
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. at 902 (citing Entzel v. Moritz Sport and Marine, 2014 ND 12, 841 N.W.2d 774, 
778 (N.D. 2014))(citation omitted). 
 10. Id. at 903 (citing see Entzel, 841 N.W.2d at 778 (N.D. 2014)). 
 11. Continental Res., Inc. v. North Dakota Dep’t. of Envtl. Quality, 2019 ND 280, 935 
N.W.2d 780, 785 (N.D. 2019). 
 12. Id. at 782. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 783. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 784. 
 17. Id. 
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rule, that Continental was attempting to change the rule instead of seek 
clarification to ambiguity.
18
 Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment 
to dismiss the suit.
19
 
Hess Bakken Investments II, LLC v. AgriBank, FCB 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that a lease phrase “actual 
drilling operations” was ambiguous and subsequently remanded the case.
20
 
In 2004, Hess and two other companies (“Hess Group”) acquired working 
interest as a non-operating interest owner in two leases (“Subject Leases”) 
that would expire in April 2012 with Continental acting as the operator of 
the wells.
21
 The Subject Leases had provisions that stated the leases would 
not terminate if “actual drilling operations” were ongoing.
22
 In March 2012, 
Continental conducted preparatory work for drilling operations.
23
 In April 
2012, the Subject Leases were assigned to Intervention Energy and 
Riverbend Oil & Gas (“Intervention”).
24
 Hess Group sued to quiet title and 
for a declaration that the Subject Leases were not expired.
25
 The district 
court granted Intervention’s motion to dismiss and reasoned that actual 
drilling operations meant “placing the drill bit in the ground and penetrating 
the soil” to find that the Subject Leases were expired.
26
 
On appeal, Hess Group contended that the word “operations”, out of 
“actual drilling operations”, included the preparatory work Continental 
conducted in March 2012 which extended the expiration of the Subject 
Leases.
27
 Intervention on the other hand, asserted that “actual” meant 
“drilling into the ground.”
28
 The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that 
because each party had rational interpretations to the phrase, the parties 
rendered the phrase ambiguous.
29
 Further, the existence of ambiguity meant 
                                                                                                             
 18. Id. at 785. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Hess Bakken Investments II, LLC v. AgriBank, FCB, 2020 ND 172, 946 N.W.2d 
746, 750 (N.D. 2020). 
 21. Id. at747. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at748. 
 27. Id. at748-79. 
 28. Id. at -749. 
 29. Id. at -750. 
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it was improper to dismiss the suit as a matter of law and therefore, the 
court reversed the dismissal order and remanded the case.
30
 
B. Federal Courts 
Kodiak Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. v. Burr 
On appeal from a case previously discussed in volume four, number 
three of this Article, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held 
that sovereign immunity did not bar claims for injunctive relief,
31
 tribal 
court remedies were exhausted prior to filing suit in federal court,
32
 and that 
factors weighed in favor of a preliminary injunction against tribal court 
jurisdiction over the case.
33
 In 2014, individual members of three different 
tribes sought to recover royalty payments when three separate companies 
were accused of burning flares, thus committing waste and breaching lease 
agreements.
34
 Two companies, Kodiak and HRC Operating, LLC( 
“Kodiak”), filed suit in federal court, where the cases were combined, for 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the plaintiffs and the tribal court 
judge (“tribal court officials”) after the tribal court ruled it had jurisdiction 
over the dispute.
35
 The district court granted the companies’ motion for 
preliminary injunction and dismissed the tribal judge’s motion to dismiss.
36
  
On appeal, the tribal court officials argued that sovereign immunity 
barred the suit in federal court
37
 and that Kodiak did not exhaust tribal court 
remedies.
38
 The court reasoned that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction 
because oil and gas leases arise under federal law and therefore, contract 
disputes to the leases are a federal question.
39
 Also, because tribal court 
authority of non-tribe members was limited to either a consensual 
commercial relationship between a tribe member and non-tribe member or 
when the tribe was protecting the autonomy to its internal relations, the 
court found that neither scenario was applicable to the current suit.
40
 
Therefore, because federal law applied and not tribal law, the court found 
                                                                                                             
 30. Id. 
 31. Kodiak Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. v. Burr, 932 F.3d 1125, 1132–33(8th Cir. 2019). 
 32. Id. at 1132. 
 33. Id. at 1139.  
 34. Id. at 1130. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 1131. 
 38. Id. at 1133. 
 39. Id. at 1136. 
 40. Id. at 1138. 
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tribal jurisdiction improper, and that Kodiak had exhausted their tribal court 
remedies.
41
 Consequently, the court held that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion because Kodiak showed a strong likelihood of success on the 
merits and the balance of factors favored Kodiak.
42
 
Enerplus Res. (USA) Corp. v. Wilkinson 
On appeal from a case previously discussed in volume four, number 
three of this Article, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held 
that the merger of two companies, one of which owned oil and gas leases, 
was not an assignment that would prompt Indian American law and that 
there was no dispute as to the amount owed.
43
 In 2010, Peak North and 
Wilkinson entered into settlement agreement where Wilkinson gained an 
overriding royalty interest (“ORRI”) in some oil and gas leases.
44
 Peak 
North later merged with Enerplus.
45
 Enerplus then, by clerical error, 
overpaid Wilkinson by nearly three million dollars in royalty payments.
46
 In 
seeking to recoup the overpayment, Enerplus filed suit in federal court in 
accordance with a forum section clause found in the settlement agreement 
with Wilkinson and Peak North.
47
 The district court granted a preliminary 
injunction, denied Wilkinson’s motion to dismiss, and ordered the money to 
be placed in the court’s registry.
48
  
Wilkinson then appealed the court’s grant of the preliminary injunction 
only to be affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Enerplus 
then moved for summary judgment to recoup the overpayment to which 
Wilkinson argued it lacked standing to enforce the forum selection clause 
because “the Settlement Agreement incorporates by reference the 
underlying leases, which prohibit the assignment of mineral interests 
without approval from the Secretary of the Interior” in accordance with 
American Indian reservation law.
49
 The district court ruled that Enerplus 
had standing because Peak North and Enerplus merged and therefore, there 
was no assignment.
50
 Enerplus then filed another motion for summary 
judgment to enjoin Wilkinson from claims regarding the settlement, 
                                                                                                             
 41. Id. at 1133. 
 42. Id. at 1139–40. 
 43. Enerplus Res. (USA) Corp. v. Wilkinson, 801 Fed.Appx. 448 (8th Cir. 2020). 
 44. Id. at 449. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 450. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss2/17
2020] North Dakota 213 
 
 
assignment, and enjoin the tribal court from exercising jurisdiction.
51
The 
district court ruled for Enerplus and included attorney’s fees and costs.
52
 
Wilkinson’s motion for reconsideration was denied, but on appeal 
Wilkinson argued Enerplus lacked standing and that the ORRI percentage 
used by Enerplus was incorrect, thus there was an issue of material fact as 
to the amount Enerplus claimed. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit held that: (1) Enerplus had standing because Peak North and 
Enerplus had merged which avoided any need for approval of an 
assignment by the Secretary of the Interior and (2) because Wilkson failed 
to pursue evidence of a dispute in discovery, there was no dispute as to the 
overpayment amount.
53
As a result, the court affirmed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Enerplus.
54
  
Pitchblack Oil, LLC v. Hess Bakken Investments II, LLC 
In Pitchblack, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that 
overriding royalty interests found in a lease would not burden Top Leases 
when the Top Leases differed from the underlying Subject Leases.
55
 In 
2005, Rocky Mountain Exploration, Inc. (“RME”), in partnership with 
Pitchblack and Whitetail Wave, LLC (“Pitchblack”), obtained Subject 
Leases that were five year leases. Later, RME granted overriding royalty 
interests (“ORRI”) to Pitchblack which stated that the ORRI would burden 
“any extensions or renewals thereof [i.e. of the Subject Leases] entered into 
within 180 days of expiration of the applicable Lease.”
56
 In 2010 however, 
Hess acquired “almost all of the Subject Leases and Top Leases” through 
multiple assignments and transactions.
57
 The Top Leases and Subject 




Pitchblack filed suit when Hess “denied that the overriding royalty 
interests burdened the Top Leases.”
59
 The district court granted summary 
judgment for Hess reasoning that the Top Leases were different than the 
                                                                                                             
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 451. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Pitchblack Oil, LLC v. Hess Bakken Investments II, LLC, 949 F.3d 424, 431 (8th 
Cir. 2020). 
 56. Id. at 427. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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 Pitchblack appealed the ruling and argued that Hess owed 
a fiduciary duty to renew the leases.
61
 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that 
North Dakota does not have an implied fiduciary duty in contract 
agreements and thus, the only way for Pitchblack to succeed was to show 
that the Subject Leases and Top Leases were “extensions or renewals of the 
Subject Leases.”
62
 Relying on Tenth Circuit precedent, the court held that 
leases were not extension or renewals when they materially differ.
63
 
Because the Top Leases differed in tracts of land, lease clauses, and lessees, 
the court found that the Top Leases were not extensions or renewals and 
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Hess.
64
 
SunBehm Gas, Inc. v. Equinor Energy, LP 
The U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota held that an 
operator does not have to pay interest on late royalty payments to an 
overriding mineral interest owner.
65
 SunBehm owned an overriding royalty 
interest (“ORRI”) in several oil and gas wells in which Equinor was the 
operator.
66
 Equinor began operating at some sites in 2012, 2013, and 
2014.
67
 Equinor did not pay royalty interest to SunBehm until 2017.
68
 As a 
result, SunBehm demanded interest on the late payments in accordance 
with North Dakota Century Code § 47-16-39.1 which states “if an operator 
fails to pay royalties to a mineral owner or their assignee within 150 days of 
the oil or gas being marketed, the operator owes interest on late payments at 
a rate of 18 percent per year.”
69
 After removing the suit to federal court, 
Equinor argued that N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1 did not apply to an ORRI.
70
  
The court explained that an oil and gas lease creates a working interest 
for the operator.
71
 An ORRI is “carved out of the working interest created 
                                                                                                             
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 428. 
 62. Id. at 428–29.  
 63. Id. at 430. 
 64. Id. at 431. 
 65. SunBehm Gas, Inc. v. Equinor Energy, LP, Case No.: 1:19-cv-94, 2020 WL 
2025355, at *5 (D.N.D. Apr. 27, 2020). 
 66. Id. at *1. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at *3. 
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by an oil and gas lease.”
72
 Further, because an ORRI is created out of a 
lease, its lifespan is that lease.
73
 Therefore, the court held that N.D.C.C. § 
47-16-39.1 did not apply because an ORRI “arises” out of a lease and not 
the mineral estate.
74
 The court also found that SunBehm was not a “mineral 
owner’s assignee” for the same reason.
75
 Thus, the court granted Equinor’s 
motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
76
 
Slawson Expl. Co., Inc. v. Nine Point Energy 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that an additional 
10% payment to cover costs in an oil and gas exploration agreement was 
not a covenant that ran with the land when one of the original parties to the 
agreement went bankrupt.
77
 Slawson and Triangle Petroleum Corporation 
(“TPC”) entered into an oil and gas exploration and production 
agreement.
78
 In the agreement within an area of mutual interest (“AMI”), 
Slawson was to share 30% interest from the leases it held in the AMI and 
TPC was to share 70% for the leases it held in the AMI.
79
 This two year 
agreement also stated that Slawson and TPC would share costs in 
developing the leases using the same ratio agreement.
80
 In addition, TPC 
agreed to pay an additional 10% share of the costs, on top of the 30% of 




TPC’s successor in interest filed for bankruptcy and emerged as Nine 
Point, LLC.
82
 Slawson then filed for a declaratory judgment against Nine 
Point and argued that the Promote Obligation was “a covenant running with 
the land, a real property interest, or an equitable servitude under North 
Dakota law.”
83
 The district court found that the Promote Obligation was not 
a covenant running with the land.
84
 
                                                                                                             
 72. Id. (citation omitted).  
 73. Id. (citation omitted).  
 74. Id. at *4 (citation omitted). 
 75. Id. at *5. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Slawson Expl. Co., Inc. v. Nine Point Energy, LLC, 966 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 
2020). 
 78. Id. at776. 
 79. Id. at 777.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at778. 
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On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reasoned that 
because the Promote Obligation did not benefit the land and was not a 
“promise to pay for the development or maintenance of property” that the 
Promote Obligation did not run with the land.
85
 Further, the court found that 
the Promote obligation was not an equitable servitude because it did not 
“satisfy the elements of easement by estoppel.”
86
 Lastly, because the 
Promote Obligation was an “allocation of drilling costs” it was not an 
interest in real property.
87
 Consequently, the court affirmed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Nine Point.
88
  
III. Legislative and Regulatory Developments 
A. Legislative Enactments 
No relevant oil and gas legislative enactments were passed between 
August 1, 2019, through July 31, 2020. The North Dakota legislature 




B. Regulatory Changes 
Chapter 43-02-03 (Oil & Gas) 
The amendment to North Dakota Administrative Code (“NDAC”) § 43-
02-03-15, titled Bond and transfer of wells
90
, provides that bond approval is 
mandatory prior to “construction of a site, appurtenance or road access.”
91
 
Other changes include increasing the amount from $50,000 to $100,000 
when the well utilizes commercial injection operations as well as requiring 
“a well temporarily abandoned for more than seven years to be counted in 
the six-well limit on a blanket bond.”
92
 Also, the change requires 
                                                                                                             
 85. Id. at 779. 
 86. Id. at780. 
 87. Id. at780-81. 
 88. Id. at781. 
 89. North Dakota. Learn More About the Biennium Cycle, https://www.legis.nd.gov/ 
learn-more-about-biennium-cycle (last visited Aug. 7, 2020).  
 90. N.D. Admin. Code § 43-02-03-15. 
 91. North Dakota Oil and Gas Division. Full Notice of Intent to Adopt and Amend 
Administrative Rules, https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/Z.Rule_Changes.2020.2019-08-
30.FullNotice.FiledwithLC.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2020). 
 92. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss2/17
2020] North Dakota 217 
 
 
“abandoned wells to be transferred to a bond in an amount equal to the cost 
of plugging and reclaiming the site.”
93
 
The amendment to NDAC § 43-02-03-28, titled Safety regulation,
94
 
provides that flares must be at least one hundred fifty feet from an active 




Chapter 43-02-06 (Royalty Statements) 
The amendment to NDAC § 43-02-06-01, titled Royalty owner 
information statement,
96
 provides clarification on what information is 
required on a royalty information statement, how to calculate producer’s net 
value, and how to calculate an owner’s share of sales.
97
  
The amendment to NDAC § 43-02-06-01.1, titled Ownership interest 
information statement,
98
 provides that a company must produce an 





                                                                                                             
 93. Id. 
 94. N.D. Admin. Code § 43-02-03-28. 
 95. North Dakota Oil and Gas Division. 
 96. N.D. Admin. Code § 43-02-06-01. 
 97. North Dakota Oil and Gas Division. 
 98. N.D. Admin. Code § 43-02-06-01.1. 
 99. North Dakota Oil and Gas Division. 
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